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Have new classicists invented market clearing or have they just rehabilitated it? This is the
question addressed in the present paper. It is generally agreed that market clearing underpins
Walrasian theory, so my exploration is limited to the question of whether this is also true for
Marshallian theory. I will claim that this is broadly the case: once Marshallian theory is
properly reconstructed, it exhibits market clearing as a constantly present result. Still, an
important difference between market clearing à la Walras and market clearing à la Marshall
exists: in the former market clearing is equilibrium, while in the latter market clearing can
coexist with disequilibrium. Next, I investigate whether my conclusion extends to the labour
market. Again the conclusion reached is affirmative both for Marshall’s theory and for
present-day Marshallian models. As to the latter, I take Friedman’s Phillips Curve model as a
case study. I show that this is a market clearing model in which, strictly speaking, there is no
place for the concept of unemployment — quite an ironical result for the paper that introduced
the notion of the natural rate of unemployment!
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The “new classical revolution” has been one of the outstanding features of the development of
economic theory during the last quarter of the twentieth century. The basic methodological
precept associated with it is what Robert Lucas, one of its leading figures, has called the
“equilibrium discipline”. According to this, any valid economic reasoning must be based on
two premises, that agents behave in an optimising way and that markets always clear. My
interest in this paper lies with the second of theses postulates. The question that triggered it is
“Have new classicists invented market clearing or have they just rehabilitated it”? No clear-
cut answer comes to mind. On the one hand, the label “new classicist” suggests that they
advocate a return to a view held by earlier pre-Keynes classicists. On the other hand, no “old”
classicist would have brought market clearing to the forefront in the way Lucas did nor would
he or she have declared, as Lucas has, that it had the status of a postulate. Moreover, the term
itself was probably not in use in classical times! This explains why commentators often take it
for granted that market clearing is a new classical innovation.
Exploring the issue of whether market clearing was present in economic theory prior to
Keynes is the aim of this paper. In principle such an investigation should bear on the two
main streams of neoclassical theory, the Marshallian and the Walrasian approach. However, I
will concentrate my attention on the former of these since few people would dispute the view
that market clearing is an essential feature of Walrasian theory.1  The  matter  is  more
complicated when it comes to Marshallian theory. First of all, market clearing is a Walrasian
concept,  which  is  scarcely  to  be  found  in  the  writings  of  Marshall  and  Marshallian
economists. So, before being able to assess its presence, the issue of whether it has some
equivalent in Marshallian theory must be investigated. Moreover, the notion of market
clearing is definitely related to that of equilibrium. Therefore, a clear understanding of the
latter notion is a prerequisite. The problem here is that, although this notion plays a central
role in Marshall’s theory, its exact meaning is hard to decipher for, as is well known, Marshall
was an ambiguous author who always shrank from presenting his views in any clear-cut way.
Three main points will be made. First, I will argue that the Walrasian notion of market
clearing definitely has a correspondent in Marshallian theory, namely Marshall’s notion of
market-day equilibrium (in short market equilibrium). Second, I will claim that market
clearing is always present in Marshallian theory. This is true for Marshall’s Principles (1920),
with a few qualifications. It is also true for later Marshallian literature, at least as far as can be
judged from the writings of an emblematic modern Marshallian economist, Milton Friedman.
My third point relates to a difference between the Walrasian and the Marshallian approaches.
                                       
1 Commentators such as Walker (1966) who tilt Walras towards Marshall are the exception.2
While in the former market clearing and equilibrium are part and parcel of each other, this is
not true for the latter, where market clearing can be separated from equilibrium. The belief
that non-market clearing is a normal outcome in the Marshallian approach would then be due
to a mistaken identification of of market clearing with equilibrium.
Why enter into such an inquiry? Two reasons can be put forward. The first, already evoked
above,  is  that,  in  view  of  the  present-day  prevalence  of  the  Lucasian  conception  of
equilibrium, it is worth assessing its originality. Second, such a discussion has deeper
implications. To understand this, it is easier to refer to the opposite of market clearing, market
non-clearing or market rationing — two terms that will be used interchangeably — i.e. states
where the market closes with an excess of supply over demand. One market for which such a
possibility is of particular importance is the labour market. If my claim is granted, it means
that unemployment is as absent from standard Marshallian theory as it is from economic
theory à la Lucas!
In Section 2, I recall the contents of the “equilibrium discipline”. Sections 3 and 4 deal with
two  prerequisites,  the  distinction  between  the  logical  existence  and  the  formation  of
equilibrium, on the one hand, and the definition of market clearing, on the other. In Section 5,
I present my reconstruction of the Marshallian conception of equilibrium. I also explain why
the Marshallian concept of market equilibrium can be considered the equivalent of the
Walrasian market-clearing concept. In Section 6, I claim that, once Marshallian theory is
properly reconstructed, it exhibits market clearing as a constantly present result. Still, an
important difference between market clearing à la Walras and market clearing à la Marshall
exists: in the former market clearing is equilibrium, while in the latter market clearing can
coexist with disequilibrium. Discussions about market clearing are particularly relevant when
it comes to the labour market. Therefore, I explore in Section 7 whether my conclusion about
the presence of market clearing in Marshallian theory also applies to the labour market. I
argue that this is the case, at least as far as Marshall’s value theory is concerned. While
unemployment did find some place in his work, it was confined to business cycle and
monetary theory, theoretical domains that had only a loose connection with value theory. In
Section 8, I consider whether the same conclusion still holds for more recent works, taking
Milton Friedman’s Phillips Curve model as a case study.
My interest in this paper is in Marshall the value or equilibrium theorist, that is, in the views
he expounded mainly in Books III and V of the Principles. I am well aware that this is not the
Marshall preferred by many of his followers, such as Clower and Leijonhufvud (Clower and3
Leijonhufvud ([1975] 1984) or indeed most present-day Marshallian scholars.2 Still, it is the
part of his work that has been the most influential, leaving its imprint in microeconomics
textbooks and shaping economists’ standard way of thinking. Even when the scope of
Marshallian theory is narrowed down in this way, some rationale reconstruction is still
needed. It is the fate of authors, such as Marshall, who manifested ‘impatience with rigid
definitions’ to borrow from Guillebaud (1942: 333), that their interpreters have to fill in the
loopholes in their reasoning. Since there is more than one way to do this, it is no wonder that
no unanimity exists among Marshallian scholars.
2. The equilibrium discipline
By initiating the downfall of standard IS-LM macroeconomics and its replacement by a new
type of modelling, stochastic dynamic macroeconomics, Lucas has probably been the most
important economist of the last quarter of the twentieth century. The change that took place
was not only of substance, it was also methodological.
Lucas central methodological claim is that economic theory needs to respect what he calls the
“equilibrium discipline”, that is, it must be based on the postulates of optimizing behaviour
and market clearing (Lucas Sargent ([1979] 1994: 58). 3  As to market clearing,
[It] is simply a principle, not verifiable by direct observation, which may or may not be
useful  in  constructing  successful  hypotheses  about  the  behaviour  of  these  series.
Alternative principles…are similarly ‘unrealistic’, in the not especially important sense of
no offering a good description of observed labour market institutions (Lucas and Sargent
[1979] 1994: 21). 4
When it comes to explaining how market clearing may come about within the context of the
Walrasian approach, the lineage adopted by Lucas, the usual story is the auctioneer scenario.
It is based on the assumption that there exists an outside market secretary, who announces
prices and allows trade to take place once equilibrium has been reached. Most economists
referring to the auctioneer do so only grudgingly because it is difficult to deny that the
                                       
2 See, for example, Arena and Quéré (2003)  and Leijonhufvud (1998).
3 A critical assessment of the equilibrium discipline can be found in De Vroey (2004a).
4 As Lucas stated in an interview with Snowdon and Vane,   “I think general discussions, especially by non-
economists, of whether the system is in equilibrium or not are almost entirely nonsense. You can’t look out of
this window and ask whether New Orleans is in equilibrium. What does that mean? Equilibrium is a property of
the way we look at things, not a property of reality”. (Snowdon and Vane, 1998: 127). This point has escaped
many commentators who instead have presumed that Lucas was making a claim as to the real-world existence of
market clearing. See e.g. Malinvaud (1984: 18), Grandmont (1983: 2), Solow (1990: 28), Lipsey 2000: 72).4
auctioneer is more of a deus ex machina than a plausible representation of market forces,
more a way of sidestepping the issue of the functioning of markets than a solution to it. But
then  no  alternative  stories  are  available.  Admitting  that  market  clearing  ought  to  be
considered a postulate and resorting to the basically inappropriate yet convenient auctioneer
hypothesis are thus the two sides of the same coin.
Lucas’ and his fellow authors have been fully consistent in their methodological stance:
market rationing is absent from their models. This is especially true for unemployment, the
most significant case of market rationing. It plays no role in their main contribution to
economic theory, the equilibrium modelling of the business cycle.
In most such models [of the business cycle] unemployment as a distinct activity plays
no role whatever. For many other economists, explaining the business cycle is taken to
mean accounting for recurrent episodes of widespread unemployment. From this
alternative viewpoint, a model with cleared markets seems necessarily to miss the main
point, however successful it may be in accounting for other phenomena, and the work of
‘equilibrium’ macroeconomists is often criticized as though it were a failed attempt to
explain unemployment (which it surely does fail to do) instead of as an attempt to
explain something else (Lucas 1987: 48).
3. The logical existence of equilibrium and the formation of equilibrium: two distinct
issues
Whatever  the  conception  of  equilibrium  held,  two  different  objects  of  study  must  be
distinguished: the determination of equilibrium and its formation. The former aims at
ascertaining the logical existence of an equilibrium solution making economic agents’ plans
compatible. The question of how the equilibrium might be brought about is the second object
of study: it being admitted that equilibrium exists logically, how can it become established as
the result of agents’ interactions? The first of these two issues has received most attention
from economists, yet completeness requires the second to be tackled as well. 5
The determination/formation of equilibrium distinction underpins Walras’s Element of Pure
Economics (1954). Walras’s overall aim was to demonstrate the efficiency of a competitive
economy.  Achieving  this  aim,  he  realised,  implied  two  solutions,  a  theoretical  or
                                       
5 No fixed terminology exists here. Jaffé, the translator of Walras’s Elements of Pure Economics, calls what I
call ‘formation’ ‘emergence’ or ‘establishment’. He characterises the distinction in the following terms: “The
laws of the emergence or establishment of equilibrium prices refer to the laws of those operations of the market
that result in equilibrium, whereas the laws of the determination of equilibrium price take into account the
ultimate facts and forces which constitute that price” (1954, p. 501).5
mathematical one and a practical one. The latter consisted of demonstrating that the operation
of competition in the economy produced a solution which was identical to the theoretical one
(1954: 106). Walras’s theoretical solution corresponds to what I call the issue of the
determination of the logical existence of equilibrium, his practical solution to what I call the
formation of equilibrium. To him, the issue of the logical existence of equilibrium took the
upper hand over that of its formation. In the process of revising the Elements, he became
gradually aware of the fact that allowing out-of-equilibrium trading led the economy to
converge to a state of equilibrium different from that obtained when studying equilibrium
from its logical existence angle. Facing such a lack of coincidence between the theoretical and
the practical solutions, he excluded any out-of-equilibrium trading in order to maintain the
coincidence, thereby making his tâtonnement assumption totally unrealistic.
Marshall’s standpoint was the opposite although the distinction between the determination
and the formation of equilibrium was only implicitly present in his work. In the barter
appendix in which he analyses the exchange between apples and nuts (1920: 791-3), he
distinguishes  between  two  notions  of  equilibrium,  “true  equilibrium”  and  “accidental
equilibrium”. While he does not bother to define them, true equilibrium corresponds to
Walras’s theoretical or mathematical solution: it is the equilibrium calculated by outside
economists pondering upon the logical existence of equilibrium. The accidental equilibrium
also belongs to the logical existence inquiry. It refers to any equilibrium result — an
equilibrium in that it is a state where all possibilities of mutual gain have been exploited —
different from the true equilibrium. The main point, however, is that Marshall’s priority was
the  study  of  the  formation  of  equilibrium.  Unlike  Walras,  he  had  little  interest  in
demonstrating the logical existence of equilibrium, and contented himself with assuming that
a true equilibrium existed.
4. Defining market clearing
Market clearing is a Walrasian concept. It belongs to a broader picture in which the economy
is viewed as a succession of points in time, each of which is associated with a tâtonnement
process directed by the auctioneer. Market clearing refers to the outcome of a given trade
round and designates a state where the excess demand for every good is equal to zero, which
indicates that the equilibrium price vector has been arrived at.6 As to the choice of this
terminology, in his microeconomics textbook, Perloff gives the following justification: “the
                                       
6 A positive excess demand can exists if the numeraire price of the good is equal to zero, the case of ‘free
goods’.6
equilibrium price is called the market clearing price because it removes from the market all
frustrated buyers and sellers” (2001: 29).
A more formal definition can be found in any microeconomics textbook. Take for example,
Mas-Colell, et al. (1995: 314). They consider an economy consisting of consumers indexed by
i=1, …I firms indexed by j=1, …J and goods indexed by l=1, … L. Together with profit
maximization  and  utility  maximization,  market  clearing  is  a  condition  for  Walrasian
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functions of the price vector (P).
Market clearing is point-in-time equilibrium — in a given trade round all agents’ optimising
plans, pertaining to production and trade, have been made compatible. This equilibrium exists
both at the interactive level (production and trade plans are made compatible) and at the
individual level (agents see their optimising plans come through). Market non-clearing is
synonymous with disequilibrium. Yet, in this framework states of disequilibrium only have a
virtual existence since they are eliminated by the auctioneer before the opening of trade.7
The  notion  of  market  clearing  can  also  be  approached  with  reference  to  the
determination/formation distinction. It has been seen above that Walras  was aware of the
need for the theoretical and practical solutions to the problem of equilibrium to coincide. This
has a direct bearing on the definition of market clearing. For a given market outcome to
qualify as market clearing, it must be identical to the outcome calculated by the economist
when analysing the logical existence of equilibrium.
                                       
7 Market clearing is only one of the two elements composing Walrasian theory, as it pertains to an economic
outcome arising at one point in time. The intertemporal behaviour of the economy, its evolution across trade
rounds, is the other element. While Walras broached this briefly in his credit model, its basic conceptualization is
due to Hicks in his Value and Capital (1939). Faithfully to Walras, Hicks considered that market clearing
prevailed at each point in time (although he changed his view on this point later on), but admitted that the
economy might depart from its intertemporal equilibrium path, thereby making the notion of disequilibrium
relevant for designating such departures (1946: 132). However, authors such as Lucas have refused to tread in
Hicks’s footsteps in this respect.7
5. The Marshallian conception of equilibrium
Well aware of the importance of time for economics, Marshall was keen to associate time and
equilibrium. Yet, as was often the case with him, ambiguities kept looming. With hindsight,
two rival interpretations of his views on equilibrium and time prove possible.
According to the standard interpretation, Marshall held three distinct concept of equilibrium,
each of which could be the subject of a separate analysis: market equilibrium (or ultra-short
equilibrium), short-run equilibrium and long-run equilibrium.8  The  drawback  of  this
conception is that the links between the time periods remain in the dark, no hint being given
as to how to piece them together. An alternative interpretation, my preferred one and the one
to which I shall stick henceforth, consists of putting Marshall more firmly in the lineage of the
classical standstill-gravitational conception of equilibrium by reducing these three categories
to two, which, moreover, are now viewed as organically linked. When this line is taken, the
Marshallian conception inherits two features of the classical conception. The first is that two
equilibrium concepts are present — in the classical universe, market prices equilibrium and
normal prices equilibrium, in the Marshallian, market equilibrium and normal equilibrium.9
The second feature is gravitation. The two equilibrium concepts are in a relationship of
hierarchy with normal equilibrium being the higher or more fundamental concept and market
equilibrium the lower or less fundamental one. That is, market equilibrium will gravitate
around normal equilibrium and the market will come to a standstill only when the market
equilibrium values (i.e. quantity and price) coincide with the normal equilibrium values.
Normal equilibrium exists whenever the market outcome in a given branch is such that firms
lack any incentive to change their behaviour, any previous decision to change behaviour
having been finalised (Marshall's attention focused more on firms than on households). As
soon  as  market  equilibrium  values  fail  to  coincide  with  normal  equilibrium  values,
disequilibrium can be said to prevail. Market equilibrium indicates that agents’ plans have
been made compatible, the quantity produced being given. This duality of equilibrium
concepts translates into a duality of adjustment processes and supply and demand functions.
                                       
8 See, for example, Hicks (1939), Stigler (1946) or Frisch (1950). In Stigler’s words, “One of Marshall’s greatest
contributions to economic theory was the discovery that the pricing problem should be treated primarily from the
point of view of time. He distinguishes three fundamental time periods in pricing: 1) market prices – the price of
a commodity during a period in which its supply is fixed; 2) short-run normal price – the price of a commodity
during a (longer) period in which the rate of production (per unit of time) is variable, but in which there exists a
fixed plant; 3) long-run normal price – the price of the commodity during the period in which the rate of
production is completely variable, a fixed plant no longer existing” (Stigler 1946: 147).
9 The distinction between the short and the long period is still present yet each of these is now considered a sub-
case of normal equilibrium.8
Adjustment towards normal equilibrium occurs across market days while adjustment towards
market equilibrium occurs within a given market day.10 As to supply and demand functions,
normal equilibrium pertains to the matching between normal supply and demand, market
equilibrium to the matching between market supply and demand.
The result of this duality of equilibrium concepts is that three rather than two outcomes are
conceivable: (a) it can be the case that both equilibrium concepts are satisfied; (b) it can also
be the case that none of them is fulfilled; (c) finally, market equilibrium may turn out to exist
in combination with a lack of normal equilibrium. The first case could be called ‘full
equilibrium’ and the second ‘full disequilibrium’, the term ‘disequilibrium’ tout court being
reserved for the third occurrence. This last appellation follows from the fact that normal
equilibrium  is  more  important  than  market  equilibrium.  Hence  the  market  should  be
considered in disequilibrium as long as normal equilibrium fails to prevail even if market
equilibrium is present.11
I am now able to address the question of what the equivalent of the Walrasian notion of
market clearing is in the Marshallian universe. This boils down to the question of which of the
two equilibrium concepts in Marshall’s theory market clearing should be associated with? The
spontaneous  answer  is  ‘full  equilibrium’,  in  which  case  the  issue  of  the  permanent
achievement of market clearing in Marshallian theory could be answered at once — in the
negative. Yet there is no logical reason for such an association, which is too demanding. The
very existence of two equilibrium concepts allows market clearing to be given a more limited
scope, designating one of the two possible outcomes of a given trade round, while leaving any
assessment of the deeper equilibrium nature of this outcome for the theory of the formation of
normal equilibrium.
If this point of view is adopted, market clearing can be stated to exist in the Marshallian
approach whenever market supply and demand end up matching in a particular market on a
given market day —  in other words, when the quantity and price observed at the end of the
market day coincide with the logically existing (or true equilibrium) magnitudes.12
                                       
10 The Marshallian and Walrasian approaches have in common the assumption that trade is confined to well-
delineated trade rounds. In Walrasian theory, the trade round is associated with a given dated tâtonnement
process, in Marshallian theory with the market day. Both conceptions can be subsumed into Hicks’ ‘week’
device, where trade takes place exclusively on Mondays.
11 The cobweb model is a good example of states of disequilibrium-cum-market equilibrium.
12 A further lesson to be drawn is that that the notion of disequilibrium is understood differently in the
Walrasian and the Marshallian approach. In the Walrasian approach, disequilibrium exhibits two features: first, it
is the opposite of market clearing and, second, it has only a virtual existence. In contrast, in the Marshallian
approach, disequilibrium can coexist with market clearing and has an effective existence.9
6. Assessing the existence of market clearing in Marshall’s Principles
Our next step is to investigate the characteristics of market equilibrium in Marshallian theory.
Is it always realised? Or is market disequilibrium a conceivable outcome? And, if always
realised,  is  this  because  market  clearing  has  been  postulated  or  does  it  result  arise
endogenously from the operation of the market? These are the issues addressed in this section.
To elucidate them, I turn to Book V Chapter II of the Principles (in which Marshall examines
the operation of a daily corn market in a small provincial town) and to his barter appendix.
Let me start with the barter appendix. Here Marshall makes the point that there is little chance
of arriving at a true equilibrium in a barter context. The culprit is the income effect. Most
probably, trade will start at a false price, i.e. at a price different from the true equilibrium
price. This will change agents’ endowments, which in turn will lead them to modify their
trade offers. Path dependency crops up. Trade will stop when all opportunities for mutually
beneficial exchanges are exhausted, yet this end result is an accidental equilibrium, not the
true equilibrium. The underlying factor is that the two goods exhibit a decreasing marginal
utility. Fortunately enough, this negative conclusion ceases to be valid when the exchange
becomes monetary — that is, in his apples-nuts example, if nuts are considered as the
monetary good — since in a monetary economy it can be assumed that money has a constant
marginal  utility.  This  feature  itself  results  from  another  assumption,  that  an  agent's
expenditure in the market in point be small relative to his or her total expenditure. Path
dependency  being  thereby  eliminated,  the  exchange  process  will  end  up  at  the  true
equilibrium position even if false trading is accepted. More precisely, the total quantity of
apples exchanged will be the same as it would have been without  false trading, and the final
price will correspond to the true equilibrium price. The distribution of nuts will however be
different from what it would have been otherwise.
The same argument underpins Marshall’s analysis in Book V Chapter II of the Principles
where, after having first evoked the view that the attainment of true equilibrium resulted from
agents’ perfect knowledge of the circumstances of the market, Marshall again takes up  the
constant marginal utility of money assumption. The result of this (on top of Marshall’s
general assumption of an additive utility function) is that the quantity sold and the final price
will coincide with the true equilibrium values (700 quarters, 36 shillings.)
It is not indeed necessary for our argumentation that any dealers should have a thorough
knowledge of the circumstances of the market. Many of the buyers may perhaps
underrate the willingness of the sellers to sell, with the effect that for some time the
price rules at the highest level at which buyers can be found; and thus 500 quarters may10
be sold before the price sinks below 37s. But afterwards the price must begin to fall and
the result will still probably be that 200 more quarters will be sold, and the market will
close on a price of about 36s. For when 700 quarters have been sold, no seller will be
anxious to dispose of any more except at a higher price than 36s., and no buyer will be
anxious to purchase any more except at a lower price than 36s. (Marshall, 1920: 334) 13
This groping scenario produces a result that is close to the realisation of the true equilibrium
with more acceptable assumptions: the quantity of corn traded is the same as in true
equilibrium, and the price of corn in the last transaction is the same as in true equilibrium.
However agents end up with different money balances. This scenario is appealing because it
conveys the idea of trial and error, a central feature of a decentralised market. It is then small
wonder that most commentators (e.g. Hicks (1965), Dasgupta (1990) and Negishi (1989))
have bestowed high praise on Marshall for his false trading analysis. To all these authors, this
explanation is the core of Marshall’s corn model, the general plausibility of the constant
marginal utility of money assumption remaining unquestioned.
I, however, have a more critical judgement of Marshall’s reasoning since I am of the opinion
that this assumption is ad hoc. First, it cannot be asserted in general that all expenditures
represent a small proportion of an agent’s total income. Just think of markets for durable
goods. Second, the generalisation from partial to general equilibrium analysis becomes very
difficult, if not impossible, with such an assumption. It would be necessary to establish the
order in which consumers visit markets, and it would turn out that the constant marginal
utility of money would become less and less valid as the number of markets which remain to
be visited falls. Third, the assumption may be plausible as far as the demand side is concerned
(and moreover only the demand for a certain range of consumer goods), but what about
suppliers, especially when the latter are firms? Fourth, if the idea of a well-delineated trade
round is to be retained, what guarantees are there that the bargaining process will come to an
end before the end of the time span allotted to trading?
Actually, there is an alternative to the constant marginal utility of money assumption. In
effect, earlier in the same chapter Marshall invokes another channel, already alluded to above,
through which true equilibrium can emerge, namely agent’s perfect knowledge of the market
circumstances.
                                       
13 For modern expositions of Marshall’s point, see Newman (1990) and Mas-Collel, Whinston and Green
(1995).11
The price of 36s. has thus some claim to be called the true equilibrium price: …; and
because every dealer who has a perfect knowledge of the market expects that price to be
established (1920: 333).
This quotation is somewhat puzzling. It is true by definition that any perfectly informed agent
will know the true equilibrium price. Yet the knowledge of the true equilibrium price by some
agents is not a sufficient condition for its realization. A further step is needed, to move from
Marshall’s assertion that some dealers have foreknowledge of the market outcome to the
stronger assertion that every dealer is endowed with this foreknowledge. If this is the case,
every supplier will be ready to trade at a price higher than 36 shillings, and every consumer at
a lower price, yet under these conditions no one will find a trading partner. Hence the only
price at which trading will take place is 36 shillings. Thus, if Marshall’s statement is
reconstructed in this way, market equilibrium turns out to be arrived at as the result of agents’
ability to form correct conjectures as to the equilibrium values.
At first sight, this perfect information assumption does not look too worrying — at least, it
looks less worrying than the auctioneer assumption. If markets are small, the total amount of
information agents have to master is manageable. Moreover, Marshall supposes a stable, if
not unchanging, world. There are basic facts of business which remain unchanged and which
agents can use in decision-making. The assumption that agents have perfect knowledge seems
an admissible way of capturing the view that traders are experienced, acute and quick
learners.
However, upon closer scrutiny a less sanguine conclusion emerges. Among the several
objections that can be addressed to the perfect information assumption, I shall limit myself
here to the most important one. It has the flaw of running counter to a basic trait of a
decentralised economy, namely that it is a private economy, the private term applying not
only to ownership but also to information. The crucial issue is how agents might come to
know market supply and demand functions. Clearly, the outside economist is able to assess
them, yet why would this also be true for the inhabitants of the model, the economic agents?
We, Marshall’s readers, may well have a supply and demand graph before our eyes, yet the
agents within the model do not! In order to be able to reconstruct it, they would have to be
cognoscenti  of  the  private  data  (preferences,  technological  constraints)  that  underpin
individual supply and demand functions. But why should these data become common
knowledge? It is in every agent’s interest to refuse to communicate them to other agents. In
short, adopting the perfect knowledge assumption amounts to blurring the level  of knowledge12
of the omniscient outside economist and that of the economic agent.14 First impressions to
the contrary notwithstanding, the omniscient agents assumption is as much a deus ex machina
as the auctioneer.
In Marshall’s defence, it can be argued that this defect is less dramatic than it might appear at
first sight. Had Marshall not been Marshall, and had he been ready to admit the central role
played by perfect information in his theoretical construct, he might have defended it by
arguing that the overarching aim of his theory of value was to provide a theory of the working
of competition. Such a theory would focus on the formation of normal equilibrium with
respect to which the formation of market equilibrium is peripheral. In other words, Marshall
might have claimed that the way in which markets function daily is of lesser importance than
how they adjust over time. Add to this the fact that explaining their daily functioning in a
general way proves to be a daunting task. If a task is at the same time daunting and of
secondary importance, it is better to put it aside by summoning a deus ex machina so as to
direct the investigation towards the most important issue.
Be that as it may, it turns out that Marshall had two irons in the fire. When it came to
addressing the issue of how markets functioned, he proposed the false trading/constant
marginal utility of money story with its undeniable advantage of coming closer to picturing
the functioning of the market in a decentralised fashion. Yet, for all its appeal, this scenario
has  no  general  validity.  Marshall’s  second,  less  ostentatious,  iron  in  the  fire  was  the
assumption that agents were omniscient. Evidently, this assumption can be useful, but only in
the same way as the auctioneer, by dodging an intractable issue.
When the inquiry is limited to the issue of how market equilibrium is obtained in a particular
market, the first line is admissible. But it cannot do when it comes the more important subject
of how markets adjust over time, that is, the study of the formation of normal equilibrium.
Although still a far cry from a general equilibrium model, such an analysis necessarily
comprises an element of interdependency since production decisions hinge on the market
conditions prevailing in the factors markets. At this stage of the theory, the false trading story
no longer works, and in effect it vanishes from Marshall’s theory. Admittedly, the perfect
information scenario still receives little recognition — this would be too much to ask from
Marshall and Marshallian economists tangled up in their concern with realism. Yet, with the
                                       
14 This point was emphasised long ago by Hayek ([1937] 1948). The canonical Walrasian model is also based on
the assumption of perfect information yet its domain of relevance is smaller than in the Marshallian case,
because of the existence of the auctioneer. His presence has the straightforward implication that agents do not
need to be cognoscenti of supply and demand functions, and hence of the private preferences underpinning these
functions. See De Vroey (2003) for further discussion of this point.13
constant marginal utility of money no longer being invoked, perfect information remains the
only available explanation.15
7. Unemployment
Of all possible markets, there is one for which the claim that the idea of market rationing is
banished from Marshallian theory seems particularly inappropriate, and that is the labour
market. Should this be an exception to my general conclusion? My answer is in the negative:
the Marshallian canonical model has no place for unemployment.
Although no systematic analysis of the labour market is to be found in the Principles,
Marshall made scattered remarks about it. These pertained to the particularities of the demand
for  and  supply  of  labour.  But  he  never  took  the  further  step  of  studying  how  these
particularities impinged on the working of the labour market.16 Silence is consent. The
bottom line must be that, to Marshall, the labour market operated on the same principles as
the corn market, in which case it could not be an exception to the market clearing principle.
Whenever Marshall discussed unemployment, he related it to low human capital, sectorial
shifts in employment and the business cycle. As noted by Matthews (1990),
Cyclical unemployment was par excellence a ‘Vol. II’ subject, along with business
cycles generally. It does get some treatment in the Principles, but to a large extent
Marshall’s views have to be pieced together from his various writings. Those are often
fragmentary or aphoristic. (Matthews 1990: 35)
According to Matthews (1990), Marshall’s limited interest in unemployment could be
explained by social context.17 For my part, I think that an additional explanation, of a more
                                       
15 “But though everyone acts for himself, his knowledge of what others are doing is supposed to be generally
sufficient to prevent him from taking a lower or paying a higher price than others are doing. This is assumed
provisionally to be true both of finished goods and f their factors of production, of the hire of labour and of the
borrowing of capital” (Marshall 1920: 341). For a more in-depth analysis, again, see De Vroey (2003).
16 Marshall also asserted that the constant marginal utility of money assumption was inappropriate as far as
labour was concerned.
17 In Matthews’s words, “Unemployment, particularly in combination with inflation, has made the functioning
of  the  labour  market  a  central  topic  in  present-day  economics.  Unemployment  has  been  judged  as  both
intellectually anomalous and a social challenge. This emphasis is absent in Marshall. The social problem that
disturbed his conscience was poverty; and poverty might have a number of causes, of which unemployment was
only one. Marshall usually discusses unemployment under the designation ‘inconstancy of employment’,
implying that people affected do have work some of the time. This was realistic. The social security system that
prevailed at the time the Principles was written scarcely allowed an able-bodied man to stay wholly without
earnings for years at a stretch. Marshall had therefore no need to address himself to the problem of persistent
long-term unemployment. But even a limited spell of unemployment could be a serious source of poverty for a
working class family, given its low financial reserves, and it could cause a ‘nasty notch’ in the nurture of its14
methodological nature, is in order. I view Marshall as subscribing to a methodological
practice which held sway until recently — more precisely, until the rise of equilibrium models
of the business cycle. It consists of dividing economics into two broad sub-fields: value
theory, dominated by equilibrium principles, where market clearing always obtains; and
business cycle theory, where monetary disturbances are supposed to play a central role and
which is divorced from those principles. The notions of equilibrium and disequilibrium may
still be evoked, but their use is more metaphorical than analytical. The problem is of course
how to reconcile these two strands. As long as it is adopted, economists cannot but exhibit
split personalities. When wearing their value theory hat, they need to exclude rationing in
general (and unemployment in particular) from their discourse, whereas they have no qualms
about such outcomes when speaking as business cycle theorists. This is, I suggest, the
situation in which Marshall unwittingly found himself.
The above consideration explains why two outwardly opposite statements are both valid, that
the category of unemployment is present in Marshall’s theoretical work; and that the standard
Marshallian model of the labour market features market clearing in the same way as the corn
or the fish market, and has thus no place for unemployment! Of course, this proved to be an
awkward position for the first generation of Marshallian economists (e.g. Pigou) to hold. A
few way-outs were considered — the exogenous wage floor hypothesis, sluggish wages,
market imperfections — yet to little avail. While the mandatory wage idea was too trivial a
solution, the other two lacked a theoretical foundation. No clear indication was provided as to
how they could occur within the basic Marshallian exchange model. With hindsight, this is no
wonder, not because the idea of friction makes no sense but rather because (as modern search
models make clear ) its theorisation requires a framework different from the standard
Marshallian trade organisation,.
Finally, it must be noted that my claim that unemployment has no place in the standard
Marshallian labour market involves no exclusion of labour market disequilibrium. The latter
will simply take the form of over- or under-employment, a departure from the level of
employment associated with normal equilibrium.
                                                                                                                          
children. Nonetheless Marshall was inclined to think that the problem was exaggerated or at least that it was a
mistake to suppose that it had got worse over time, or that it was worse than it had been for many workers in pre-
industrial times.” (1990: 33-34)15
8. Unemployment in the writings of modern Marshallian authors: the case of Milton
Friedman 18
Should the above conclusion about exclusion of unemployment be extended to more recent
works, which in one way or another can be traced back to Marshall? Since a systematic study
of this issue is beyond the scope of this article, I will content myself with examining the case
of an author who can be considered the emblematic modern Marshallian economist, Milton
Friedman. My concern here is with his influential Presidential Address on the Phillips Curve
(Friedman 1968). Friedman’s overall argument in this paper is well known. Therefore, I shall
concentrate my attention on the precise point that I wish to make.
Friedman has recurrently proclaimed his Marshallian affiliation. It may thus be safely
assumed that his Phillips Curve model belongs to the Marshallian approach. We have seen
that the canonical Marshallian model has no place for unemployment. Yet Friedman’s paper
became famous for having introduced the notion of a natural rate of unemployment. This
discrepancy can be interpreted in two ways: either Friedman’s model turns out to be an
amendment of the canonical Marshallian model, the result of which being that the excluded
concept becomes acceptable; or it should be concluded that Friedman fell prey to the not so
unusual flaw of pasting a non-Marshallian narrative onto a Marshallian model. I shall argue
that this is indeed the case. Possibly because of its nature as a Presidential Address,
Friedman’s 1968 paper is a narrative without explicit model. Yet an implicit model is
definitely present. It is made explicit in Friedman’s Price Theory textbook (1976, 221 seq.).
Figure 1 reproduces its central graph.
                                       
18 This section draws on De Vroey (2001).16
Figure 1. Friedman’s labour market with workers’ misperceptions
Whenever inflation is absent, Friedman’s reasoning runs, everything proceeds smoothly.
Before entering the market, all participants know its equilibrium values, the coordinates of 0
in the graph. The market outcome (E0) corresponds to what Friedman calls the natural rate of
unemployment, an appellation that I will declare misplaced below.  However, as soon as
inflation enters the picture, as the result of the monetary expansion, a different outcome
surfaces. Consider the first trading round at which the impact of monetary expansion becomes
visible in the labour market. Employees develop a false conjecture about the prices of goods,
the result of their adaptive expectations. Failing to anticipate that a rise in price is going to17
occur in the consumer goods markets, they expect that a higher real wage will be associated
with a higher nominal wage. On the basis of this conjecture, they mentally construe the new
market equilibrium as the intersection (Aw) of the new perceived demand curve and the
unchanged supply curve. They are ready to trade at a higher employment/nominal wage
mix.19 As to firms, they are aware of workers’ misperception. They realise that it is
tantamount in its effect to a change in workers’ preferences. Hence they are ready to go down
their demand curve to the point of intersection with the shifted supply curve, Ae. 20 Endowed
with their respective conjectures about the market equilibrium values, workers and firms
come to the market with an exchange proposal that happens to involve the same increased
quantity of labour traded (EF) and the same nominal wage (not on the graph). Exchange on
this basis is possible and will take place.
This is Friedman’s model of the labour market. Several comments are in order. First, in
Friedman’s reasoning, the formation of labour market equilibrium involves workers and firms
needing and being able to assess the market demand and supply schedules — and hence their
intersection — on their own. This confirms my claim above that agents’ ability to mentally
reconstruct market supply and demand functions is the key factor in explaining the formation
of market equilibrium. “To the workers, it will appear as if the demand for labour has shifted
to the right…”. “For employers as a whole, it will appear as if the supply curve had shifted to
the right…” These sentences make sense only if the formation of equilibrium results from
agents’ ability to assess market supply and demand functions. Though Friedman does not
stress it — and possibly might not have realised it — his reasoning rests on the premise that
the agents in the model are as knowledgeable about it as the outside omniscient economist,
except for one aspect, workers’ misperception, which is nothing more than a minimal change
to it.21 Second, looking at Friedman’s graph, we can observe that his model features market
clearing: market-day supply of and demand for labour are equal and amount to 0-EF. In other
words, nothing in his graph points to the existence of market rationing, i.e. unemployment.
                                       
19 “As yet they have no reason to suppose a change in the price level, hence they have no reason to change their
supply function. It will remain the solid supply curve on Figure 12.6 [Figure 1 above], if we interpret P* as the
price level perceived or anticipated by workers. To them, it will appear as if the demand for labour had shifted to
the right, to the dashed demand curve. At each nominal wage rate (also real wage as perceived by them),
employers are seeking to hire more workers.” (Friedman 1976: 224; his emphasis)
20 “Employers faced with an increased nominal demand for their products will count on being able to get a
higher price or the equivalent. The same nominal wage means a lower real wage in terms of that higher price of
his product. For employers as a whole, it will appear as if the supply curve had shifted to the right to the dashed
supply curve.” (Friedman 1976: 224).
21 It is usually believed that Lucas’s Neutrality of Money model (Lucas [1972] 1981), which overhauled
Friedman’s model, rests on stronger information assumptions, the result of adaptive expectations being replaced
by rational expectations. Yet, this is only part of the story. Actually, in Lucas’s model, the domain of knowledge
ascribed to agents is narrower than in Friedman’s due to the presence of an auctioneer.18
Third, Friedman’s natural rate of unemployment is nothing other than the quantity component
of Marshallian normal equilibrium. In turn, the result described in Figure 2 can be viewed as a
standard  case  of  Marshallian  disequilibrium,  featuring  a  deviation  of  the  market-day
equilibrium values (EF, WE) from their normal equilibrium values (E0, W0).22 Departures
from the natural rate of employment rather than from the natural rate of unemployment are the
real object of Friedman’s model. Strictly speaking, there are no unemployed agents in his
model  but  only  agents  who  are  temporarily  over-employed  with  respect  to  normal
equilibrium.23
Friedman seems to be aware that something is wrong with this, yet he evades the issue by
evoking frictional unemployment.
At the point of intersection O, the market is in equilibrium at the wage rate W0, with the
amount  of  labour  employed  E0,  equal  to  the  amount  of  labour  demanded.
Unemployment  is  zero  –  which  is  to  say,  as  measured,  equal  to  ‘frictional’  or
‘transitional unemployment, or to use the terminology I adopted some years ago from
Wicksell, at its ‘natural’ rate. (1976: 217).
But this resort to frictional unemployment is contrived. Frictional unemployment may well be
meaningful in other types of models of the labour market yet not in the Marshallian,
Friedman’s reference.24
The conclusion to be drawn is that Friedman’s model significantly differs from his narrative.
As the former should prevail over the latter, the elements that are present in the narrative yet
absent from the model, in particular unemployment, should be eliminated. Recall Lucas’s
remark (quoted above) that equilibrium models of the business cycle evolve without resorting
to the unemployment category. The same must be said about Friedman’s Phillips Curve
model. It abides by the equilibrium discipline, featuring both optimizing behaviour and
market clearing. Hence it has no place for unemployment per se. If it departs from Lucas’s
model, it is on another point, namely its exhibiting a co-existence between market clearing
and disequilibrium.
                                       
22  Friedman’s  unease  in  this  respect  is  illustrated  by  his  awkward  use  of  the  expression  of  ‘overfull
employment’ (1976, 223).
23 This point has escaped the attention of most commentators. Tobin (1995) is an exception.
24 As aptly pointed out by Hahn, “Traditional search theory finds no formal representation of the economy in
macro theories of the natural rate. It is referred to, or better appealed to, but it is not connected with the theory
proposed” (1995: 52). See also Rogerson (1997) who confronts Friedman’s categories with the search approach
and makes it clear that his model is far from being a search model.19
From a methodological standpoint, Friedman’s flaw lies in his unawareness of the fact that he
is attributing economic agents the same knowledge of the constituants of the market as that
held by the outside economist — more specifically, an ability to reconstruct market supply
and demand functions.
A final, wider remark is worth making. I have claimed that Marshallian theory rests on the
market-clearing  postulate.  This  claim  is  verified  in  Friedman’s  model  once  this  is
disentangled from his realistically-slanted narrative. However, I do not want to claim that it is
impossible to introduce market rationing in models having a Marshallian lineage. Let it be
accepted that efficiency wage models can be characterised as having such a lineage. Their
hallmark  is  to  display  an  involuntary  unemployment  result.  Is  my  analysis  thereby
invalidated? I do not think so. It is just that a subtler qualification of the concepts involved is
required. To be specific, let me briefly comment on Shapiro and Stiglitz’s well-known
shirking model (1984).
My starting point is Lucas’s association of individual equilibrium (optimising behaviour) with
market clearing. In my analysis above, market equilibrium is considered the Marshallian
incarnation of the Walrasian market-clearing notion. Whenever market equilibrium prevails,
so does individual equilibrium. The originality of efficiency wage models is that they break
the  link  between  these  notions.  Market  equilibrium,  still  associated  with  individual
equilibrium, and market clearing have become diverging phenomena. That is, market clearing
is no longer a necessary attribute of market equilibrium. However, the conclusion that the
equilibrium discipline has been dispensed with should be avoided. It is just that its contents
needs to be rephrased as consisting of optimising behaviour and market equilibrium, the latter
now ceasing to go along with market clearing. Efficiency wages models are then a case where
market rationing has indeed replaced market clearing. Nonetheless, they still abide by the
equilibrium discipline, properly redefined.
9. Concluding remarks
In this paper I have addressed the issue of whether Marshallian theory abides by what Lucas
pinpointed as the economic discipline, with special attention being given to its market
clearing aspect. I have answered in the positive by claiming that the Marshallian equivalent to
the Walrasian notion of market clearing is the matching of market supply and demand.
However, my paper has shown that the matter is more complex than when the investigation
bears on Walrasian theory.   The first compounding factor is that the matching of market
supply and demand can accompany disequilibrium, defined as a mismatch between normal
supply and demand. Since at present most economists have in the back of their minds a20
Walrasian definition of equilibrium, where equilibrium and market clearing coincide, it is
small wonder that they mistakenly extend the possibility of disequilibrium to that of market
non-clearing. A second compounding factor is that Marshall held two conceptions of the
formation of market equilibrium. When he came to address this issue specifically, he was able
to present a rather realistic model allowing for “haggling and bargaining” and false trading.
Yet, when it came to making an assumption about the formation of market equilibrium on
which to base the study of normal equilibrium, it was agents’ perfect information — the
assumption that they were able to reconstruct market supply and demand functions — that did
the job. In the latter case, there is no doubt that market clearing is always achieved. In the
former, we have what could be called quasi-market clearing: the quantity traded is the same as
in true equilibrium, and ditto for the price of the last transaction. The only difference is that
agents’ money holdings will differ from those they would otherwise have held.
All this leads me to conclude that Lucas and his associates have not invented market clearing
but rather restored it. Their distinct contribution is to have changed its status, from a hidden
premise to an explicit postulate. To me, this is an important methodological clarification.
Should new classical theory be considered less original than claimed? Not necessarily. It is
rather that its originality lies elsewhere. At this late stage, I must limit myself to a few broad-
brushed remarks.
First of all, as already mentioned, new classicists have breached the gulf that earlier existed
between value theory and business cycle theory – quite a feat. Second, accepting that
macroeconomics is defined as pragmatic, simplified general equilibrium models, they may be
credited with having invented ‘Walrasian macroeconomics’ to replace the earlier prevailing
‘Marshallian macroeconomics’.25 Third, Lucas and Sargent were right in stating that their
approach is based on a different concept of equilibrium. The Marshallian approach rests on a
standstill or stationary conception of equilibrium, the new classical on the Walrasian-Hicksian
intertemporal conception. One important implication is worth mentioning. Associated with
the stationary conception of equilibrium is the notion of “period of analysis”: the economy or
the market is studied over a period of time during which its basic data are supposed to remain
unchanged, only accidental and reversible changes being accepted. The drawback of this way
of positing issues is that economic change cannot be tackled in earnest. In contrast, this
feature of unchanging fundamental data is no longer required in the intertemporal equilibrium
approach, what permits to come to grips with the study of the economy “in time”.
                                       
25 See De Vroey (2004b).21
All the above points suggest that new classical economics has made a progress with respect to
Marshall. In contrast, the last difference that I wish to evoke points in the opposite direction.
As I have shown, the fact that the Marshallian approach rests on the market clearing postulate
does  not  preclude  its  addressing  the  issue  of  the  working  of  competitive  forces.
Disequilibrium  analysis,  as  understood  in  the  Marshallian  approach,  is  the  study  of
competition. Things change when the duality of equilibrium concepts is dropped. Now the
market-clearing postulate prohibits any study of how the invisible hand functions. What was
once considered the main puzzle that economic theory had to solve – the efficiency of a
decentralised economy – has become a foregone conclusion.
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